The influence of religious institutions, people and ideas over American foreign policy has been a growing area of inquiry among social scientists and other scholars in recent years. And although there has been considerable disagreement about the extent of religious influences over a broad range of foreign policy questions, there is massive consensus on the efficacy of religious influence on one policy issue: the United States' long-term support for the state of Israel. This paper draws on the University of Akron's National Survey of Religion and Politics, administered in every presidential year since 1992, to trace the religious sources of that support within the American public, considering ethnoreligious factors, theological tendencies and political theology, in the context of other demographic and ideological influences. We find that religious variables far outweigh other factors in predicting public support for the state of Israel.
Introduction
Political scientists have long ignored religion's influence on public attitudes about American foreign policy (Hero 1973; Jelen 1994) . In recent years, however, journalists and scholars alike have been fascinated-and sometimes alarmed-by evidence that religious faith is now shaping both opinion and participation in the foreign policy arena (Boyer 2005; Urquhart 2005; Phillips 2006; Preston 2010) . Indeed, the press has recounted religious activism on issues ranging from the Iraq war to global climate change. Although scholars have been slower to address the evidence, recent books and articles have shown that faith and foreign policy do intersect (Mead 2004 (Mead , 2006 Guth 2009 Guth , 2010 Guth , 2011 Rock 2011.) One exception to past neglect of religion's role in foreign policy has been the enduring interest in public attitudes toward Israel, and the consequences for American policy (Merkley 2001 (Merkley , 2004 Mearsheimer and Walt 2007) . Indeed, two eminent pollsters have argued that this is the only foreign policy issue where public opinion is influenced by religious views (Kohut and Stokes 2006) . Although much evidence refutes this assertion (Page and Bouton 2006; Guth 2009 ), there is little doubt that religion profoundly shapes Americans' attitudes toward critical Middle East issues (Barker, Hurwitz and Nelson 2008; Baumgartner, Francia and Morris 2008; Froese and Mencken 2009; Guth et al. 1996; Smidt 2006 ).
Despite such findings, there are considerable gaps and a good bit of confusion in the literature. First, much of the analysis has focused on only two religious communities, Jews and Evangelicals. Not surprisingly, the first major review of religion and foreign policy attitudes discovered that American Jews overwhelmingly supported the state of Israel, whereas "Protestants" and "Catholics" were much less favorable and did not differ substantially from each other or the larger public (Hero 1973, 78) . More recently, speculative attention has turned to Evangelical Protestants' contribution to "Christian Zionism" (Weber 1983 (Weber , 2004 (Weber , 2010 Sizer 2004; Northcott 2004; Clark 2007; Dittmer and Sturm 2010) and empirical work has confirmed that these believers do feel warmer toward Israeli interests than other Christians (Guth et al. , 2005 . Some analysts even argue, or at least imply, that aside from Jews, Evangelicals hold the only distinctive attitudes on either side of this issue (Mayer 2004; Barker, Hurwitz and Nelson 2008) .
While highlighting the postures of Jews and Evangelicals, most studies neglect the remaining three-fourths of the public (see, for example, Starobin 2010), even though there is substantial evidence that other religious groups also vary substantially in support for Israel. In fact, by the early 1990s Mainline Protestants were more sympathetic to Arab interests than their Evangelical brethren, and Roman Catholics, black Protestants, and secular citizens (in that order) were even more "balanced" in their approach Wald et al. 1996) . Of course, these positions may have changed over the past two decades, at the very same time that the American religious community has diversified, with increasing numbers of Latino Catholic and Protestants, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and members of other world religions, as well as growth in the ranks of secular Americans (Eck 2001; Green 2009 ). Clearly, a fresh and comprehensive analysis of religious influences on attitudes toward the Middle East is warranted, going beyond the simple descriptive patterns that characterize most studies.
In this paper, we consider a broad range of religious influences on American public attitudes toward the Middle East, more specifically on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. First, we outline two important theoretical perspectives on American religious politics, and more specifically, their impact on foreign policy attitudes. Second, we review the religious landscape on attitudes toward the Middle East conflict, considering opinion trends among ethnoreligious traditions and theological factions. Third, we formalize our expectations about the influences of religious factors, based on our theoretical reflections and the previous literature. Finally, we test these hypotheses using the 2008 National Survey on Religion and Politics, a large-sample study with detailed measures of the religious dimensions of "belonging, believing and behaving."
Religious Influences on Foreign Policy
Why do Americans in different religious traditions hold distinctive stances on Middle East policy? To organize the range of potential influences, we draw on two often competing interpretations of American religion's political role, ethnoreligious theory and restructuring theory. Ethnoreligious theory emphasizes the way group affiliation shapes political alignments.
This perspective owes much to ethnocultural historians who stress the political importance of the historic European religious groups that migrated to America and often multiplied upon reaching her shores. In their view, nineteenth-century party politics consisted largely of assembling winning coalitions of contending ethnoreligious groups (Kleppner 1979) . Well into the twentieth century, the GOP represented historically dominant Mainline Protestant believers, such as Episcopalians, Presbyterians and Methodists, while Democrats spoke for religious minorities: Catholics, Jews, and Evangelical Protestants (especially in the South).
By the 1980s, these configurations had shifted, as Mainline Protestants dwindled in number, Evangelicals moved toward the GOP, the ancient Catholic-Democratic alliance frayed, and black Protestants became a critical Democratic bloc. Growing religious diversity added Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and others to the equation, usually on the Democratic side. Even today many analysts think in ethnoreligious terms, referring to the "Evangelical," "Catholic,"
"Jewish" or "Muslim" vote. Although the assumptions underlying this analytic framework are often incompletely articulated, historians in this school usually argued that ethnoreligious groups held differing worldviews, cultural preferences, and negative reference groups-all shaping their attitudes on public policy, including foreign affairs (Kellstedt et al. 2007; Swierenga 2009 Ethnoreligious theory may point out the relevant groups for analysis, but seldom really clarifies the extent to which attitudes are shaped by religion, ethnicity, or political context, respectively. While the reasons behind the Jewish support for Israel (or American Muslim opposition) may be self-evident, 1 the attitudes of other ethnoreligious groups may be more puzzling. For example, studies have found African Americans more critical of Israel and quite likely to cite religious reasons for that stance (Green 2009 ), but there is little consensus on the sources of these views, religious or otherwise. The same is true for distinct perspectives of Latino Catholics and Protestants, non-Christian religious minorities, and secular voters.
Of course, the tendencies of all ethnoreligious traditions may be shaped in part by 1 Even among Jewish Americans there are significant differences in attitudes toward Israel. See the fascinating analysis in Wald and Williams (2006) . leadership cues, whether these come from local clergy (Guth 2007) , denominational officials (Rock 2011) , or religious movement leaders (Barker, Hurwitz and Nelson 2008 (Smith and Levine 2010; Akin 2010) . At the same time, the growth of liberation theology in both traditions actually produced a theological bias for the Palestinian cause (Guth 2007) . For a recent example of Mainline and Catholic criticism of Israel, see Dart (2010) .
emergence of such ethnoreligious minorities might produce a new type of public internationalism in American foreign policy, focused less on military power and more on diplomacy, international institutions, and human rights-values long neglected by dominant ethnoreligious traditions (Shain 1999) . This perspective has some empirical support (Guth 2010a (Guth , 2010b ).
An alternative way to understand American religion is the religious restructuring or culture wars theory, introduced first by Robert Wuthnow (1988) , but brought into common political parlance by James D. Hunter's Culture Wars (1991) . Hunter saw new religious battles emerging within the old traditions, based on theological differences: "Orthodox" believers accept "an external, definable, and transcendent authority," and adhere firmly to traditional doctrines, while "progressives" replace old religious tenets with new ones based on personal experience or scientific rationality (Hunter 1991, 44) . The progressives are often joined by secular Americans who reject religion entirely but see morality in a similar vein. Indeed, since Wuthnow and Hunter wrote, the unaffiliated have grown in number, enhancing their potential influence and presumably bolstering the "progressive" camp (Hout and Fischer 2002) . These religious divisions quickly congealed around issues such as abortion, feminism, and gay rights, but soon showed evidence of infusing other attitudes as well.
Indeed, the echoes of culture war battle cries are often heard in foreign policy debates.
According to many analysts, religious traditionalists (Hunter's "orthodox") Catholics should encourage a less militaristic foreign policy, focused more on social welfare, economic development, and protection of the natural environment, policies usually associated with "cooperative internationalism" (Wittkopf 1990; Guth et al. 1997, 58-77; Kurtz and Fulton 2002; Rock 2011 ).
Thus, the restructuring perspective focuses on "orthodoxy/progressivism" and its policy In a related vein, religious exclusivism or "particularism"-the belief that there is only one true faith-might also lead American Christians to support the only nation representing "Judeo-Christian values" in the Middle East against the predominant Muslim "otherness" of the Arabs (Gitlin and Leibovitz 2011) . In contrast, religious pluralists, those who see equal value in all great religions, might be expected to be more sympathetic to the Palestinians. Finally, moral traditionalism, support for traditional moral values, is a strong predictor of attitudes on social issues such as abortion and gay rights, but is also connected to conservative attitudes on a wide range of issues, such as a militant foreign policy (Conover and Feldman 1986) . As a result, we expect that moralism will also buttress support for Israel. Thus, from the religious restructuring perspective we envision a division of opinion over Israel between the biblically orthodox, 4 In some of our earlier work, we use the term social theology to capture this dimension of belief . 5 Froese and Mencken (2009) use the term sacralization ideology to refer to conservative versions of civil religion. We have used civic religion in previous work, covering much the same conceptual territory (Guth et al. 2006 (Guth et al. 1997; Guth 2007) . In any event, we suspect that religious belief and involvement should produce varying effects in different religious contexts. period. 7 Table 1 reports the proportion of respondents in each ethnoreligious tradition who "strongly agree" or "agree" each year, as well as net changes from 1992 to 2008. For the three major white Christian traditions, we also report results for three theological factions, based on our measures of "biblical orthodoxy," labeled as "traditionalists," "centrists" and "modernists."
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[ Table 1 H4. Support for civil religion, religious exclusivism and moralism will enhance support for Israel, independent of theology.
H5. Association with the Christian Right will produce more support for Israel, association with the Religious Left will reduce that support.
H6. Political orientations will influence attitudes, with Republicans, conservatives, American exceptionalists, militant internationalists, and opponents of cooperative internationalism more supportive of Israel.

Data and Methods
To explore the religious sources of support for Israel in the American public, we use the (Holsti 2004, 220; Mayer 2004, 705; Green 2009 ). 10 Model 1 uses ethnoreligious tradition alone, with the "unaffiliated religious" and "other Christians" as the omitted reference category (these groups combined have a score that is almost identical to the sample mean).
Model 2 adds religious belief and religious behavior, as well as interaction terms to the equation.
Biblicism is a factor score derived from five questions that tap "biblical orthodoxy,"
Dispensationalism is measured by an item on the "End Times," and religious involvement is a factor score based on five common religious activities (see Appendix for more on these items).
As we expect Biblicism, dispensationalism and religious involvement to have effects that vary by tradition, we tested interactive terms for the three largest ethnoreligious groups.
Model 3 introduces political theology, religious beliefs about the social and political world that might shape attitudes toward foreign policy. Civil religion is a factor score based on five questions about the appropriate role of religion in American politics. Religious particularism is tapped by a question about the equal truth value of all the world's religions. Moralism asserts that there is only one moral system valid in all times and places. 11 Model 4 adds religious mobilization, gauged by respondents' felt proximity to the "Christian Right" and "Religious
Left." Finally, Model 5 adds political orientations to the mix. We include party identification and ideology, both shown to be powerful influences on foreign policy attitudes in recent years 10 As in earlier studies, older respondents, men, and the wealthy are modestly more positive toward Israel. In this survey, however, education does not make a difference. These account for just over one percent of the variance.. 11 This item substitutes for the moral traditionalism scale available in ANES (Conover and Feldman 1986) . Exploration shows that it behaves in very similar ways with dependent variables such as abortion and thus seems a reasonable proxy for the broader scale. (Holsti 2004 East conflicts. Contrary to expectations, however, analysis shows that Biblicism has the same impact across major religious traditions: none of the interaction terms we tried revealed even the hint of an "added" effect, so these were omitted from the final equation. 12 The case for "End Times thinking" is different: although dispensationalism encourages pro-Israel attitudes across the sample, this effect is enhanced in the Evangelical context where, presumably, such attitudes find both community reinforcement and more frequent endorsement by religious leaders.
[ Table 2 about here]
Religious involvement sometimes bolsters support for Israel, as discovered in some earlier studies, but that effect also varies by tradition. As predicted, religiously active Belief and behavior measures clearly improve overall explanation, increasing the variance explained to almost fifteen percent.
interaction terms for this effect in the analysis, given the relatively small N for the first two groups and the weakness of the pattern for Black Protestants. 
Discussion and Conclusions
The findings here demonstrate the importance of widening the analytic horizons in seeking the sources of public support for Israel. Scholars have generally followed the popular press in its fascination with the roots of the "Israeli lobby" in the American Jewish community and the rise of Evangelical Protestant concern for the state of We have no way of testing these suggestions, but they are just as worthy of scholarly attention as the theological sources of pro-Israel sentiment among the larger Christian traditions, especially as many Black Protestants cite religious beliefs as the basis for their views (Green 2009, 5) .
Indeed, the sources of opinion in many of these groups will require much more examination to sort out the ethnic, religious and political components.
In the large white Christian traditions, theological factors clearly play a major role in disposing Evangelicals, Mainliners and Anglo-Catholics toward one side or the other in the Middle East. 13 To begin with, the conclusions of dozens of books and hundreds of articles about "End Times theology" are correct: adherents of these ideas do support Israel. But, as some scholars have recently argued, general biblical orthodoxy is an even more powerful influence over those attitudes, perhaps because of its broader reach into more religious communities (Weber 2010; cf. Green 2009) . Indeed, these theological variables, buttressed by political theology, reduce remaining differences among the major traditions to insignificance and also Upon reflection, this analysis also shows that the oft-noted "partisan gap" between Republicans and Democrats is really a "religious gap" between the base constituencies of the two parties; once religious variables are in the equation, there is virtually no partisan "residue"
13 Not all members of the three major communities see religion as a factor in their views on the Middle East. Fewer than half the Evangelicals and only ten percent or less of the other two communities cite religious beliefs (Green 2009 ). Of course, one need not consciously engage a belief system for it to influence other attitudes. Thus, contemporary religious politics seem likely to limit the discretion of chief executives of either party. The Obama administration's experience has certainly reflected these realities: overtures to Muslims and a hard line on West Bank settlements met with enthusiastic approval from some party constituencies, but harsh critiques from many Jewish Democrats, leading to quick back-pedaling by the administration. And, as George W. Bush discovered, the GOP religious base also presents major constraints to innovative solutions to the Middle East conflict offered by a Republican president (Marsden 2008, 215) . Although the absolute level of American public support for Israel will depend in part on events in the region, major shifts in this religious pattern of attitudes are unlikely in the near term. An American president will be required to exhibit unusual political courage to overcome the obstacles presented by religious opinion to a peaceful settlement.
Appendix
This study is based primarily on the pre-election sample of the Fifth National Survey of Religion and Politics, conducted June-August 2008 by the University of Akron. The survey produced a national random sample of 4,017 adult Americans (with a margin of error plus or minus 1.5 percent). The 2008 results are compared where appropriate to the results of previous versions of this survey conducted in 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004 . The previous surveys were supported by grants from the Pew Charitable Trusts, and in 2004, the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. The survey had a response rate of 36% of the telephone numbers contacted.
Variables
Biblicism is a factor score utilizing five belief questions appropriate to the religious traditions of the vast majority of Americans (theta reliability=.82). Religious involvement is a religious behavior measure based on five common religious practices (theta=.80). Both are described in Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth (2009, 25) . To create the categories of traditionalists, centrists and modernists, we arbitrarily divided the sample in thirds based on that factor score.
Moralism is a five-point scale item asking how strongly the respondent agreed or disagreed with the statement: "There are clear and absolute standards for right and wrong."
Religious Exclusivism is a five-point scale item asking how strongly the respondent agreed or disagreed with: "All the great religions of the world are equally true and good."
Civil religion is a factor score derived from a principal components analysis of five items tapping the respondent's sentiments about religion in public life. These include the perceived importance of religious faith to the respondent's political thinking, whether or not the President should have a strong religious faith, whether politicians should discuss religion in public, and the appropriateness of the involvement of religious groups and institutions in the political process. (theta reliability=.74). For more information, see Guth et al. (2006) .
Dispensationalism is measured by a five-point item asking how strongly the respondent agreed or disagreed with the statement: "The world will end in a battle at Armageddon between Jesus and the Anti-Christ." This question was asked of all Christians.
Active-part internationalism is tapped by a question asking how strongly a respondent agreed or disagreed with: "The United States should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can on their own." (cf. Page and Bouton 2006, 70) .
American exceptionalism is measured by a forced-choice question offering two options: "(1) The U.S. has a special role to play in world affairs and should behave differently than other nations, OR (2) The U.S. has no special role and should behave like any other nation."
Militant internationalism is represented by a question on the importance of the United States "maintaining a strong military," with options of "not," "somewhat," and "very" important.
Cooperative internationalism is represented by a question on the importance of "strengthening the United Nations," with options of "not," "somewhat," and "very" important. 
